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UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16861 (4th Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS

Anthony and Cleveland Robinson, along with
five codefendants, were charged with and convicted
of various drug related crimes under 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), 846, 848(a), 852 and 860(a). Anthony
was convicted of thirteen counts and Cleveland was
convicted of eleven counts. These convictions included conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base (crack)
and possession with intent to distribute thirty-six
grams of crack cocaine. Both Anthony and Cleveland received life sentences on the continuing criminal enterprise charge and extensive concurrent sentences on the other counts.
The Robinsons appealed their convictions.
Among the various issues on appeal, the Robinsons
claimed that the federal sentencing guidelines are
unconstitutional because they result in disproportionate sentences for blacks convicted of drug offenses involving cocaine in the form of crack.
The Robinsons relied on State v. Russell,' where
the Minnesota Supreme Court employed a more
stringent version of the federal rational basis test to
examine the Minnesota drug statute. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the state statute discriminated unfairly based on race. Sentencing under the Minnesota drug laws imposes a penalty of
twenty years in prison for possession of three grams
of crack cocaine, while possession of three grams of
powder cocaine results in only five years in prison.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that harsher
sentencing for violations involving crack cocaine as
compared to powder cocaine had a disproportionate impact on blacks. 2 Additionally, the Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that there was not a
rational basis for the differential treatment in sen-

'477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).

21d.

at 889 (Minn. 1991)(holding that the statutory
distinction between the quantity of crack cocaine possessed and powder cocaine possessed violated the equal
protection
guarantees of the Minnesota constitution).
3
1d. at 889.

4See

s d.

Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).

tencing for crack cocaine and
powder cocaine un3
der state constitutional law.
Current federal law has a sentencing scheme
somewhat comparable to that of the State of Minnesota for cocaine violations. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, there is a one hundred to one
ratio in sentences for crack as opposed to powder
cocaine. 4 For example, current federal law requires
that a first-time offender carrying fifty grams or more
of crack cocaine get the same sentence as someone
who has five hundred grams of powder cocaine.'
The federal sentencing disparities are a result of
Congress deciding that crack cocaine is one hundred times more harmful than the same amount of
powder cocaineY
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the rational basis test should be applied to
judge whether the sentencing guidelines violate the
Equal Protection Clause.7That is, lacking some proof
or underlying discrimination in the statute, differential impact may be sustained if it has a rational
basis." According to the court, purposeful discrimination has yet to be shown in the federal sentencing
guidelines." The court supported the rationality of
the disparate treatment by concluding that "it is common knowledge that crack is ... much more addictive than powder cocaine.""'
In a more expansive look at the rationality of
the sentencing disparity, the court noted that crack
is less expensive, more accessible, more addictive,
and specifically targeted towards youth." Thus, the
court found that Congress could have rationally concluded that the distribution of crack cocaine is a
greater problem for society than that of powder cocaine.'2 Therefore Congress had a rational basis for
"See Woodlee, Plan Targets Mandatory Drug Terms,

Washington Post, March 2, 1994 at D1.
, United States v. Robinson, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
16861 at 13 (4th Cir. 1992).

"Id.
"Id.
"'Id. at 13-14.

Id. at 13-14.
2
'1
Id.

imposing harsher sentences for crack cocaine offenses.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
I. Scope of Judicial Review
The most important aspect of a claim of legislative violation of the Equal Protection Clause is the
standard of review employed by the court. In determining the appropriate level of review in the present
case, the court cited Rogers v. Lodge,'3 in that "purposeful racial discrimination invokes the strictest
scrutiny of adverse differential treatment. Absent

such purpose, differential impact is subject only to
the test of rationality." 4
The rational basis test puts the judiciary in the
most deferential posture vis-a-vis the legislature.' s

In general terms, the federal rationality or rational
basis test is a two-prong analysis: 1) the statute or
law must not be arbitrary; and, 2) it must bear a
rational relationship to the desired end.' 6 Under this
standard of review the courts will almost always
uphold a challenged statute as long as there are some
set of facts that could constitute a rational basis for
7
the legislation.'

On the other hand, the strict scrutiny test is the

least deferential standard of review.' Under strict
scrutiny, the court determines whether the legislation bears a sufficiently close relationship to a compelling or prevailing governmental purpose.' 9 In

458 U.S. 613 (1982)(citing Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S.
229, 247-248 (1976)).
'4 Rogers, 458 U.S. at 617.
'5 See Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional
Law: Substance and Procedure, § 18.3, at 14 (2d ed. 1992)
(describing rational basis review).
'6See Kruse, Substantive Equal ProtectionAnalysis
UnderState v. Russell, and the PotentialImpacton the Criminal Justice System, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1791, 1794
(1993) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 464 (1981), in which the Supreme Court upheld a state statute which placed a ban on sale of plastic,
disposable milk containers. The Court reviewed the statute under the rational basis standard and concluded that
the evidence before the legislature supported the classification. The Court then looked at whether the classification was rationally related to the statute's purpose).
'1Id.at 1795 (citing Western Southern Life Insurance
Co. v.State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72
(1980)).
"'SeeRotunda & Nowak, supra note 15, § 18.3, at 15
(describing strict scrutiny review).
13

other words, this more exacting standard will not
be employed unless: 1) there is a compelling governmental interest; and, 2) there is a close connection between the challenged legislation and the compelling interest.20 This type of review is generally
only used in instances where legislation is facially
discriminatory.2' Strict scrutiny review will almost
always result in the revocation of the challenged statute.2 Thus, the aim of those challenging specific legislation is to persuade the court to invoke strict scrutiny review.2 To date, the United States Supreme
Court has been unwilling to apply the strict scrutiny standard to facially neutral legislation without
proof the challenged law is discriminatory both in
effect and in purpose 24 As previously stated, the
Robinsons needed the federal drug sentencing law
subjected to the standard of strict scrutiny in order
to prevail on their equal protection claim. It is clear
in cases involving crack cocaine violations that the
law is discriminatory in effect. However, discriminatory purpose or intent is not as dear. Discriminatory purpose requires proof that the government
chose a course of action "because of, and not merely
in spite of," the discriminatory impact.25 This phrase
can be interpreted to mean that it is necessary to
show that Congress decided on stricter penalties for
crack offenses because it would have a greater effect
on blacks, and that the disproportionate effect was
not simply a byproduct of facially-neutral legislation.

'9 See Kruse, supranote 16, at 1796 (citing Korematsu

v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
20See Id. at 1796.
2, See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (holding that Court

will not apply heightened scrutiny when discriminatory
intent is not present); Washington v. Davis,426 U.S. 229,

243 (1976) (holding that the Court will not invoke strict
scrutiny in absence of discriminatory intent); Palmore v.

Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (subjecting racial classification to strict scrutiny review); McLaughlin v. Florida,

379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (subjecting criminal statute
which classified on basis of race to strict scrutiny review).
2 See Kruse, supra note 16, at 1796.
2 Id.
24Id.

at 1797(citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (holding
that discriminatory impact alone fails to trigger strict scrutiny); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 US. 535, 546-49 (1972)
(declining to use strict scrutiny review without proof of
invidious
intent).
21See
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987)
(holding that statistical proof of disparate impact in capital punishment cases without evidence of discriminatory
purpose is insufficient to invoke strict scrutiny review).

The 1987 United States Supreme Court case of
6
expanded the intent element
of purposeful discrimination to criminal sentencing
cases. McCleskey, a black male, was convicted of
killing a white police officer and was subsequently
sentenced to death. McCleskey's equal protection
claim relied entirely on a sophisticated statistical
study showing blacks were more likely than whites
to be sentenced to death in Georgia. The Supreme
Court held that statistical evidence of disparate impact alone was insufficient to prove discriminatory
purpose.2 7 McCleskey had to prove that the
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. In dictum, the McCleskey Court went
on to conclude that disparities in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system.28
The burden of proving purposeful disparate
impact falls on the disparate impact plaintiff. "
Therefore, the Robinsons were in the unenviable
position of having to prove that they received a
harsher sentence because of the color of their skin.
The question of what type of evidence would be
necessary to allow the Robinsons to prove purposeful discrimination remains.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the existence of a discriminatory purpose "demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."3" Furthering the notion that disparate impact
is not irrelevant, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that an invidious discriminatory purpose
may be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts, including the fact that the law has a greater
effect on one race. 3' But disproportionate impact
alone does not render a statute unconstitutional:
McCleskey v. Kemp

2
GId.
27

1d. at 292.
7AId. at 311-312.

at 297 (holding defendant must show
decisionmakers acted with purposeful discrimination).
29 1d.

3'Rogers, 458 U.S. at 618.
3
,Washington, 426 U.S. at 235,242 (holding that fed-

eral courts would not utilize strict scrutiny review unless
discriminatory purpose shown with disparate impact. In
key Washington, black applicants for District of Columbia police officers were rejected because of a failed personnel exam. The plaintiff sued on the ground that the
test was racially discriminatory because of its disproportionate impact on minorities. The Court concluded that
disproportionate impact, without proof of discriminatory
intent, did not trigger strict scrutiny review).

Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within
the power of government to pursue, is invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one
race than of another. Disproportionate impact
is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it
does not trigger the rule' 2 that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest
of considerations."
Accordingly, under the purposeful discrimination requirement, statistical evidence of disparate impact is relevant in proving discriminatory
intent, but alone it is insufficient to invoke the
higher standard of review in federal equal protection analysis.34
Additional evidence must therefore be presented which furthers the conclusion that the
questioned statute has a discriminatory purpose.
As an example, Arlington Heights3 illustrated the
type of proof necessary to satisfy the intent element of purposeful discrimination. It suggested
that the historical background of the decision, the
specific events leading to the challenged action,
and any departures from normal procedures
would be instructive in determining discriminatory intent.3"
An examination of the legislative history of the
passage of the federal sentencing guidelines reveals
the following:

Id.
I, at 242 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida,379 U.S.

184 (1964).
,Id.
. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
'1429 U.S. 252,263 (holding that developer failed to

prove discriminatory purpose in housing development
dispute). In Arlington Heights, the Court dealt with the
refusal of Arlington Heights to rezone a parcel of land to
multiple-family from single-family. The Metropolitan

Housing Development Corporation alleged that the decision by Arlington Heights would result in racially disparate impact. The Court reaffirmed its decision in Wash.
ington . Davis which required a showing of discriminatory intent.

"'Id.at 267 (concluding that in determining whether
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor required

a sensitive inquiry into all circumstantial and direct evidence as may be available).

Examples [of race-oriented arguments and racial tension] include Congressional testimony
that most crack sellers are Haitian, black, or
Trinidadian, "wearing gold chains and diamondstudded bracelets." There were also statements
that black crack dealers would corrupt white
drug users and white communities. These statements clearly indicate an underlying racial
bias. "
Additionally, examples of departures from normal
procedure exist as the Act was hurried through Congress.3 8
Every federal appellate court that has considered an equal protection challenge in such cases has
39
come to the same conclusion as the Fourth Circuit.
One can therefore assume that it is highly improbable that any federal court will find that portions of
the federal sentencing guidelines have a discriminatory purpose.
II. Levels of Disparate Impact
The United States Supreme Court did leave a
possible distinction within disparate impact cases in
Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousingDev. Corp.40
The Court stated:
[Slometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on
grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face ....

7
See Maxwell, A DisparityThat Is Worlds Apart: The
FederalSentencing Guidelines Treatment of Crack Cocaine
and Powder Cocaine, I REAL Digest (1995) (reviewing
132 Cong. Rec. S4670 (daily ed. April 22, 1986)("Most
of the dealers, as with past drug trends, are black or
Hispanic ... Haitians also comprise a large number of
those selling cocaine rocks ... That's new and disconcerting... because they previously had not seen Haitians selling drugs. Whites rarely sell the cocaine rocks.
Streets sales of cocaine rocks have occurred in the same
neighborhoods where other drugs were sold in the past:
run-down, black neighborhoods .... But the drug market also is creeping into other neighborhoods. An interracial neighborhood ... has become one of West Palm
Beach's most highly visible cocaine rock areas. Less than
a block from where unsuspecting white retirees play tennis, bands of young black men push their rocks on passing
motorists, interested or not").
"Id. (citing United States v. Walls, 841 F. Supp. 24,
29 (D.D.C. 1994)("In further reference to departure from
normal legislative procedure, amici also offered Sterling's
observation that: [t]he development of this omnibus bill
was extraordinary. Typically Members introduce bills

The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.
But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark
as that in Gomillionor Yick Wo, impact alone is
not determinative and the Court must look to
4
other evidence. '
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 2 the statute in question allowed the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to
grant permits to operate laundries in wooden buildings. The regulation, although facially neutral, resulted in a huge disparity between the applicants
receiving the permits. The board granted permits to
almost all of the white applicants, while none of the
Chinese applicants were granted similar permits. In
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,43 the Alabama legislature
reconfigured the corporate boundary of a city from
a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure which resulted in the exclusion of all but four or five of the
previously four hundred black voters while not displacing any white voters. The United States Supreme
Court thus has set up a difference between simple
disparate impact cases and "stark" disparate impact
cases (as illustrated in Yick Wo and Gomillion). By
stating that "absent a pattern as stark as Gomillion
44
and Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative,"
the Court allows for the inference that if there is
impact as stark as is presented by these cases, then
impact alone may be sufficient to show discriminatory purpose. Thereby, the United States Supreme
Court presumes a discriminatory purpose in such
"stark" cases and places the burden on the govern-

which are referenced to a subcommittee, and hearings are
held on the bills. Comment is invited from the Administration, the Judicial Conference, and organizations that
have expertise on the issue. A markup is held on a bill,
and amendments are offered to it. For this omnibus bill
much of this procedure was dispensed with. The careful
deliberative practices of the Congress were set aside for
the drug bill"); 123 Cong. Rec. S13969 (daily ed. Sept.
27, 1986)(statement by Sen. Bingaman)("Despite the
necessity of this legislation, our haste to enact a drug bill
before we adjourn this Congress raises some questions
and some potential concerns.Are we acting to insure short
term political gain from a sudden and popularly recognized problem? Or are we making a commitment to address a serious social malaise?").
39 See United States v. Frazier,981 F.2d 92 (3rd Cir.
1992), cert.denied 113 S.Ct. 1662; UnitedStates v. Watson,
953 F.2d
895 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied.
40
See supra note 21.
41Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
42118 U.S. 356 (1886).
43364 U.S. 339 (1960).
"Arlington Heights,492 U.S. at 266.

ment to show "no intent." This line of reasoning is
consistent with Justice Marshall's dissent in Personnel Administratorof Mass.v. Feeney,4s even though it
is a gender discrimination case. Justice Marshall concluded:
Although neutral in form, the statute is anything but neutral in"application....Where the
foreseeable impact of a facially neutral policy is
so disproportionate, the burden should rest on
the State to establish that sex-based considerations played no part in the choice of the particular legislative scheme.4
The majority of defendants in powder cocaine
cases are white (approximately forty-two percent)
while only three percent of crack cocaine defendants
are white.47 Based upon these statistics, it seems clear
that harsher crack sentences are falling almost exclusively on blacks. Couple these statistics with the
police procedures to fight the "war on drugs," and it
appears that the drug laws are being discriminatorily
applied.

48

The Fourth Circuit has made an effort to close
this possible line of attack by making the conclusory
statement that "there is no argument of discriminatory application of the law that raises Yick Wo con-

45442 U.S. 256 (1979)(holding that a state preference program for veterans that does not specifically favor
males, but in which males are almost exclusively
benefitted,
does not deny equal protection to women).
4 ild.,
at 284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47
See Woodlee, Plan Targets Mandatory DrugTerms,

Washington
Post, March 2, 1994 at D1.
48
See UnitedStates v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th
Cir. 1992)(Heaney J., dissenting)(noting that crack raids
are targeted at minority neighborhoods, not Caucasian

cems."49 This issue does not appear to have been

sufficiently addressed. Counsel for defendants convicted under the federal drug laws for crack cocaine
violations will need to develop this argument to its
fullest before the court. The Fourth Circuit has already stated that defendants will have a tough burden to carry if they plan on making this "stark" impact distinction.
CONCLUSION
There appears to be circumstantial evidence
available in the legislative history of the Controlled
Substances Act and the procedures followed in its
enactment to support a finding of hidden or underlying racial motives. However, a successful attack
on the federal sentencing scheme grounded in the
Equal Protection Clause appears to be remote at
this time.
A possible untapped alternative in attempting
to prove purposeful discrimination in the federal
sentencing guidelines is to push the "stark" disparate impact argument which is buried in the United
States Supreme Court case of Arlington Heights.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
J. Scott Perkins

neighborhoods); see also Boldt, The Constructionof Responsibility in the CriminalLaw, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2245,2320
(1992)(citing studies indicating that blacks comprise 90%
of drug arrestees but only 12% of the total drug users).
4
"See UnitedStates v. D'Anjou, 16 E3d 604, 612 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that sentencing guidelines equating
one unit of crack cocaine with one hundred units of powder cocaine did not violate the Equal Protection Clause;
there is evidence of disparate impact, but no evidence of
discriminatory purpose).

